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This paper introduces money into an overlapping generations model with endogenous growth. 
The model, due to Docquier et al. (2007), exhibits a positive intergenerational externality 
which precludes its laissez-fair equilibrium to be optimal even if the government can control 
the level of physical capital and set it to satisfy the modified golden rule. The main message 
of the paper is that, as long as the modified golden rule is attained, Friedman rule is optimal. 
The result holds regardless of the ability of the government to internalize the externality and 
control the level of human capital. Other results include: (i) violation of Friedman rule for a 
different second-best environment wherein human capital accumulation is controlled but not 
physical capital accumulation; (ii) existence of a negative relationship between money growth 
rate and the economy’s endogenous growth rate, and (iii) non-uniqueness of Friedman rule. 
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 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
For over four decades, the optimal money supply literature has studied the environ-
ments under which the Friedman rule may or may not hold. One interesting result, in
the context of overlapping-generations models à la Diamond (1965), is the importance
of attaining the (modiﬁed) golden rule for the application of Friedman rule. Weiss
(1980) had originally argued that Friedman rule does not hold in overlapping genera-
tions models. Later, Able (1987) and Gahvari (1988) showed that Weiss’s result was
due to the generic failure of the laissez-faire equilibrium of overlapping generations mod-
els to deliver the (modiﬁed) golden rule. Introducing generational lump-sum tax and
transfers, or a debt policy, to control capital accumulation allows the economy to attain
the (modiﬁed) golden rule and restores the optimality of Friedman rule.1
One important feature of Diamond’s (1965) model is that it turns it into a ﬁrst-best
environment through the control of economy’s physical capital: The model contains no
other intrinsic sources of market failures (such as externalities). Extending the model to
include some form of market failure destroys this particular feature of Diamond’s model.
This opens up the question of optimality of Friedman rule even if the (modiﬁed) golden
rule is attained. van der Ploeg and Alogoskouﬁs (1994), for example, demonstrate that
Friedman rule is violated in an overlapping generations model that exhibits endogenous
growth.2 However, although van der Ploeg and Alogoskouﬁs allow for lump-sum tax-
ation and debt policy, they do not set the ﬁs c a li n s t r u m e n t si ns u c haw a ya st of u l l y
control the capital stock of the economy. Indeed, in their model, it is the non-neutrality
1Gahvari (1988) went further and showed that the optimality of Friedman rule does not rest on the
attainment of the modiﬁed golden rule. If a switch to Friedman rule is accompanied by generation
speciﬁc lump-sum taxes that neutralize the ensuing intergenerational wealth transfers, Friedman rule
becomes optimal given any initial steady state laissez faire equilibrium. This ﬁnding, and the importance
of intergenerational wealth transfers appear to have gone unnoticed in the subsequent literature dealing
with the Friedman rule until its rediscovery by Bhattacharya et al. (2005). See, e.g., Freeman (1993),
and Smith (1991, 2002). An exception is Ireland (2005); this issue has been discussed in Gahvari (2007).
2They consider a setup as in Weil (1989) wherein individuals are inﬁnitely-lived but that new gen-
erations are born every period. They also rationalize money by putting real balances in the utility
function.
1of monetary policy that leads to the breakdown of Friedman rule.
Two questions arise regarding the optimality of Friedman rule when physical capital
is fully controlled. One concerns an environment wherein the government has additional
ﬁscal instruments to oﬀset the other sources of distortion in the economy. The second
environment allows for no additional instruments. The latter environment is particularly
interesting in light of Phelps (1973) who raised one of the earliest objections to Friedman
rule. Phelps’ argument relied on an application of the general theory of second best;
see Lipsey and Lancaster (1956). This well-known proposition in public ﬁnance teaches
us that familiar ﬁrst-best prescriptions often do not hold in second-best environments.
Put diﬀerently, if there already exists a distortion in the economy, adding another
source of distortion can enhance welfare. Applied to a monetary economy, the lesson is
that the violation of Friedman rule may in fact be welfare increasing in a second-best
environment.
The current paper addresses both of these questions and studies if the control of phys-
ical capital ensures the optimality of Friedman rule in overlapping generations model
that exhibit an inherent source of distortion–with and without correcting the distor-
tion. The model that I use for this purpose is due to Docquier et al. (2007) who have
recently extended Diamond’s model to allow for endogenous growth that emanates from
building up one’s human capital. This model is interesting not only because it allows
for (per capita) growth that does not exist in Diamond (1965), but also the fact that
its laissez-faire equilibrium exhibits an additional source of market failure through an
intergenerational externality. The externality is due to the positive eﬀect of investment
in education on the human capital of not just the investor, but his children as well.
It arises when one’s human capital is determined partly through education and partly
through the human capital one inherits from his parents. However, in deciding how
much to spend on education, individuals ignore the eﬀect that their decision has on the
human capital of their children.
2To address these questions, the paper introduces money in Docquier et al.’s (2007)
model and rationalize it through a cash-in-advance constraint.3 It derives the dynamics
of the model and characterize its balanced growth path under laissez faire. Subsequently,
it derives the ﬁrst-best allocations of this economy and shows that they are not aﬀected
by the introduction of money.4 It proves that the implementation of the ﬁrst-best, i.e.
when both physical and human capital are fully controlled, requires Friedman rule to
be satisﬁed. This result generalizes the earlier result of Able (1987) and Gahvari (1988)
to overlapping generations models with endogenous growth. It also puts van der Ploeg
and Alogoskouﬁs’ result to the contrary in the right perspective.
Subsequently, the paper proves that Friedman rule holds even if one cannot control
human capital accumulation and internalize the externality of education. On the face of
it, this result appears to be surprising in the light of Phelps (1973) and the second-best
logic. The key to understanding it is that introducing another distortion in the economy
via the violation of Friedman rule does nothing to alleviate the existing distortion in
human capital accumulation, as long as one fully controls the economy’s stock of physical
capital. The paper highlights this point.
Other grounds covered by this paper include: (i) A comparison between the values
that other economic variables (besides the nominal interest rate) assume in the ﬁrst- and
second-best environments studied. Whereas the value of the nominal interest rate is zero
in both environments, the second-best entails a lower endogenous rate of growth and
a lower monetary growth rate. (ii) The study of a diﬀerent second-best environment;
one in which human capital accumulation can be controlled but not physical capital
accumulation. The paper proves that this setting calls for the violation of Friedman
rule. In this case, the distortion due to the violation of Friedman rule does alleviate
the distortion due to the lack of physical capital accumulation. (iii) The existence of a
3This is done along the lines of Hahn and Solow (1995). See also Crettez et al. (1999, 2002), and
Michel and Wigniolle (2005).
4Docquier et al.’s (2007) result applies and the relationship between laissez faire and ﬁrst-best solu-
tions remain the same as in their paper.
3negative relationship between money growth rate on the one hand and the endogenous
growth rate of the economy on the other. (iv) Non-uniqueness of Friedman rule: A
continuum of monetary growth rates and tax rates on consumption during working
years result in a zero opportunity cost of holding money.5
The paper is related to the vast literature on Friedman rule particularly those written
in the context of endogenous growth and/or within the overlapping generations frame-
work. van der Ploeg and Alogoskouﬁs (1994) referred to earlier is one. Paal and Smith
(2000) discuss the suboptimality of Friedman rule in a monetary growth model where
spatial separation and limited communication rationalize money holding for transaction
purposes. There are no (oﬀsetting) ﬁscal instruments in their model and the subopti-
mality of Friedman rule is caused by the impact of bank portfolio reallocations on the
real economy. Other similar papers that discusses the eﬀects of monetary growth on the
real economy within an endogenous growth framework include Wang and Yip (1992),
Gomme (1993), van der Ploeg and Alogoskouﬁs (1994), Jones and Manuelli (1995),
Chang and Lai (2000), Dotsey and Sarte (2000), Chang et al. (2007), and Bhattacharya
et al. (2008).
2 The model and its laissez-faire equilibrium
Consider the Diamond’s (1965) two-period overlapping generations model wherein indi-
viduals work in the ﬁrst period supplying one unit of labor, derive utility from consuming
a composite consumption good c in the ﬁrst period, and d in the second period. There
is no bequest motive, and population grows at a constant rate, n. Append to this model
(i) money holdings and (ii) human capital accumulation as modeled by Docquier et al.
(2007). To stay within a two-period formulation, assume that the decisions on human
capital accumulation, production, and consumption are all undertaken at the beginning
5The results in (iii) and (iv) generalize those for Diamond’s overlapping generations model with cash-
in-advance constraint but in the absence of endogenous growth. They are opposite the results obtained
with money in the utility function [see Gahvari (1988, 2007)].
4of period one and in the order stated.6 Output of each period can be used for consump-
tion in the same period, or retained with no depreciation, to be used next period as an
input either in the educational process of the young or the production process.
2.1 Education
At the beginning of time t, the young start life with a given amount of human capital,
ht−1, that they have inherited from their parents. I shall refer to persons born in
calendar time t as members of generation t. Thus those who are old at time t are
members of generation time t − 1. Education combined with one’s inherited human
capital determines a worker’s eﬀective labor. Thus, investing et in the young’s education
raises their eﬀective labor from ht−1 to ht. The human capital formation technology is
characterized by the linear homogeneous function Φ(et,h t−1). That is,






where ϕ(·) ≡ Φ(·,1). I assume that ϕ(·) is positive, increasing, and strictly concave; it
also satisﬁes the Inada conditions: ϕ0 (0) = ∞ and ϕ0 (∞)=0 .7
When deciding on how much to invest in their education, the young have no re-
sources. They thus borrows et each for their own education from the old of the previous
generation. In this way, each young person raises his eﬀective labor from ht−1 to ht.
In deciding how much to educate himself, the individual choose et to maximize his net
earnings. Let wt denote the real wage at time t (measured in units of composite con-
sumption good), and rt the real interest rate. The individual chooses et to maximize










6This formulation is a “short cut” to stay within a two-period overlapping generations model. A
more realistic formulation allows for three periods, the ﬁrst of which is dedicated to the education of
children.
7This process is also a “short-cut” in that one does not model the precise nature of the contribution
of a parent’s human capital to that of his children and the resources that may have to be spent in this
process.
5Observe that ϕ(et/ht−1) > 1; otherwise there will be no investment in education.
2.2 Production
Production takes place after education. The production technology, which also exhibits
constant returns to scale, uses capital, Kt, and eﬀective labor,H t, to produce a compos-
ite output, Yt = F(Kt,H t). Let Nt denote the number of young persons–equivalently
workers–at time t, and deﬁne output, capital, and eﬀective labor per worker according
to yt = Yt/Nt,k t = Kt/Nt,h t = Ht/Nt. The production function can then be presented
by yt = F(kt,h t). Assuming a competitive setting wt and rt are determined according
to
wt = Fh(kt,h t), (3)
rt = Fk(kt,h t). (4)
At the beginning of period t, prior to the educational and production decisions, the sum
of aggregate capital to be used for educational investment of the young, Ntet, and for
production, Kt, is pre-determined from the savin g sd e c i s i o n so ft h eo l da tt i m et − 1
when they were young. Moreover, given that the number of young individuals Nt is
also exogenously given, et +kt is given at time t. With et +kt given, the additional four
equations (1), (2), (3), and (4) determine the equilibrium values for kt,e t,h t,w t, and as
functions of ht−1.
2.3 Money and the current price level
Holdings of money is rationalized through a Clower cash-in-advance constraint. I assume
that it takes the form of
Mt = αNt−1ptdt, (5)
where Mt i st h ea g g r e g a t es t o c ko fm o n e ya tt i m et, pt is the price level at time t and
α<1 is the proportion of the old’s consumption that has to be ﬁnanced through cash.
6The old’s money holdings at t consist of two components: their own cash savings from
the previous period and a lump-sum money transfer from (or to) the government, st.A l l
money injections to (or subtractions from) the economy are in the form of these lump-
sum transfers. The lump-sum transfer to each old person is set equal to a fraction, θ, of






and money stock grows at the rate of θ per period according to
Mt = Mt−1 + Nt−1st =( 1+θ)Mt−1. (6)
At the end of the production process, each young person receives wtht out of which
he has to pay his educational loan to the old plus interest, et(1 + rt), and use the
rest for his consumption and savings that will be channeled into the purchase of all
real assets and the existing cash in the economy. The resources of the old consist of
the educational loan they had given the young plus the associated interest, the capital
stock they brought into production process plus interest, their cash holdings, and their
lump-sum money transfers. Their budget constraint is given by
ptdt =
pt (Kt + Ntet)(1+rt)+Mt−1
Nt−1
+ st. (7)
Assume that the cash constraint (5) is binding so that Mt/Nt−1pt = αdt. Substituting for








= pt (kt + et)(1+rt). (8)
Equation (8) then determines the price level, pt. Observe that pt depends on Mt, and
through (6), on θ.
72.4 Consumption and saving
Observe ﬁrst that consumption level of the current old, dt, is determined through equa-
tion (7). It depends on the value of pt (which itself depends on θ). Turning to the young,
their preferences are represented by
u = u(ct,d t+1). (9)
The utility function u(·,·) is strictly quasi-concave and twice diﬀerentiable. The young
consume ct each, buy the existing money stock, Mt, and save the rest of their income,
Kt+1 + Nt+1et+1. Their budget constraint is given by
ptct +
pt (Kt+1 + Nt+1et+1)+Mt
Nt
= ptwtht − ptet(1 + rt). (10)
They choose the values of their current consumption,money holdings,and real savings
based on their expectation for the future interest rate, re
t+1, and the price level, pe
t+1.
In doing so, the young realize that their expected future consumption de
t+1 will have be
































Now to consume de


















1+it+1 ≡ (1 + rt+1)(1 + πt+1). (15)
8Using the above notation, applied to expectations, substituting for Mt/(Ntpt) from (13)


















Observe that not all of the above equations are independent from one another. More-
over, the Clower cash constraint has previously been used in the determination of
kt,e t,h t,w t,r t,M t, and pt. The independent equations that remain for the determi-
nation of the laissez-faire equilibrium are (10), (14), (15), and (16).
The problem of the young can then be formulated as that maximizing the utility
function (9) subject to the intertemporal budget constraint (16) and the human capital












which is another independent equation. Two of these ﬁve equations, (16) and (17),
determine ct, and de
t+1 as functions of the already determined variables, et,h t,w t,r t,p t,




t+1. Using equations (14) and (15), one can eliminate ie
t+1 from the list of expected




t+1 = rt+1 and pe
t+1 = pt+1), closes the model.
As a ﬁnal observation, note that the determination of de
t+1 ﬁxes, via (10), the value
of (Kt+1 + Nt+1et+1), the aggregate amount of capital to be used for educational in-
vestment and for production in period t +1 . This conﬁrms my previous assumption,
when discussing education and production decisions, that this sum is pre-determined at
the beginning of each period from the decisions of the previous period.
92.5 Dynamics
First, to simplify the exposition, rewrite the variables of the model as a fraction of
eﬀective labor. Denote b et ≡ et/ht−1 and thus rewrite equations (1) and (2) as8





Similarly, denote b yt = Yt/Ht = yt/ht and b kt = Kt/Ht = kt/ht.This allows the produc-
tion function to be represented by b yt = f(b kt), where f(·) is positive, increasing, and
strictly concave. One can then rewrite equations (3) and (4) as
wt = f(b kt) − b ktf0(b kt),
rt = f0(b kt).
O b s e r v et h a tt h ev a l u e so fb et and b kt will be determined as soon as et and kt are deter-
mined.
Now, to examine the dynamic evolution of this economy, consider the following
three equations: (10), (16), and (17), where I have replaced the variables in expectation
by their “actual” values and dropped all superscripts T. First, from the Clower cash
constraint, substitute αd t for Mt/(Nt−1pt) in equation (10), then divide it by ptht, and











= wt − (1 + rt)
b et
ϕ(b et)
− b ct, (18)
where b ct ≡ ct/ht and b dt ≡ dt/ht−1.
Second, turning to (16), substitute θMt/Nt for st+1,M t+1/(1 + θ) for Mt, pt+1(1 +









= wtht − (1 + rt)et.
8From now on whenever a “hat” appears over a variable, it denotes that the variable is expressed
per unit of eﬀective labor.












Finally, assuming that the utility function (9) is homothetic, the marginal rate of
substitution between b ct and b dt+1 and between ct and dt+1 will be the same. It then
follows from the ﬁrst-order condition (17) that
ud
³




b ct, b dt+1
´ =
1+αi t+1/(1 + θ)
1+rt+1
. (20)
Now eliminate b ct between equations (18), (19), (20), and solve the remaining two
equations for b kt+1 and b dt+1. Noting that it+1 depends on πt+1 and rt+1,w t and rt
on b kt, and rt+1 on b kt+1, one will get: b kt+1 = b kt+1
³
b kt, b dt,b et+1,b et,πt+1
´
and b dt+1 =
b dt+1
³
b kt, b dt,b et+1,b et,πt+1
´






Multiply the numerator by ht−1/ht−1 and the denominator of this relationship by ht/ht













U s i n g( 2 1 )t oe l i m i n a t eπt+1 in b kt+1 = b kt+1
¡b kt, b dt,b et+1,b et,πt+1
¢
and b dt+1 = b dt+1
¡b kt, b dt,
b et+1,b et,πt+1
¢
, one gets two new expressions for b kt+1 and b dt+1 w h i c hIs h o w ,w i t ha n
abuse of notation, by b kt+1 = b kt+1
³
b kt, b dt,b et+1,b et
´
and b dt+1 = b dt+1
³
b kt, b dt,b et+1,b et
´
.
Finally, recall that the ﬁrst-order condition (2) determines b et as a function of b kt, and
thus b et+1 as a function of b kt+1. Using these relationships in b kt+1 = b kt+1
³
b kt, b dt,b et+1,b et
´
and b dt+1 = b dt+1
³
b kt, b dt,b et+1,b et
´
leads to a pair of ﬁrst-order diﬀerence equations of the
form
b kt+1 = Ψ
³
b kt, b dt
´
, (22)
b dt+1 = Φ
³
b kt, b dt
´
. (23)
11The system of diﬀerence equations (22)—(23) determines the dynamic path of the
economy. Moreover, the economy tends to a balanced growth path if equations (22)—
(23) have a steady state solution and if it is stable. Under the latter two assumptions,
the steady state values of
³
b kt, b dt
´
will be the rest point of equations (22)—(23).9
To examine the (local) stability properties of the steady-state solution, I linearize
the system of diﬀerence equations (22)—(23) around the steady-state solution
³




b kt+1 − b k
























b kt − b k




b kt − b k
b dt − b d
!
, (24)
where Ψk,Ψd,Φk, and Φd denote the partial derivatives of Ψ(·) and Φ(·) with respect
to k and d. The dynamic path given by (24) converges to a steady state as t increases
(i.e., b kt − b k and b dt − b d tend to zero), if at time t =0 , the initial values of b k0 and b d0
are such that
³
b k0 − b k, b d0 − b d
´
is in the space spanned by the eigenvectors of Ω that are
associated with the eigenvalues of Ω with modulus smaller than one. Now, at t =0 ,t h e
value of b k0 is pre-determined. However, the value of b d0 depends on p0.C o n s e q u e n t l y ,
the system will be stable for any value of p0 if Ω possesses two eigenvalues with modulus
less than one. If there is only one eigenvalue with a modulus less than one, then there
will be one value for p0 and a unique path which leads to the steady state.
9The regularity conditions one imposes on preferences and the technology ensure only that positive
values exist for the variables along a solution path. There is no guarantee, however, that there exists a
steady-state solution to which the system is driven.
122.6 Balanced growth

































= w − (1 + r)
b e
ϕ(b e)
− b c, (27)
1+π =
1+θ










r = f0(b k), (31)
w = f(b k) − b kf0(b k). (32)
These equations determine the steady state values of real variables b c, b d,b e,b k,w,r, and
monetary variables i, and π. Observe that while these values remain unchanged, the
values of the other variables of the model grow over time at a constant rate. This
is the balanced growth path of the economy. Speciﬁcally, let g ≡ ϕ(b e) − 1. Then,
et =( 1+g)et−1,h t =( 1+g)ht−1,k t =( 1+g)kt−1,c t =( 1+g)ct−1,d t =( 1+g)dt−1, and
Kt =( 1 + n)(1+g)Kt−1. Utility also grows over time. In particular, if the utility function
is homogeneous of degree β, u(ct,d t+1)=u
³






b ct, b dt+1
´
. On the















β u(ct,d t+1).10 Thus all per capita terms, ht,e t,k t,c t,d t, increase by a factor of















13(1 + g) per period and the utility increases by a factor of (1 + g)
β . Note that β>0.11
The following proposition summarizes these results:
Proposition 1 Consider a version of Diamond’s (1965) overlapping-generations wherein
each generation’s human capital is determined via the level they inherit from their parents
and their own educational attainment. Assume further that money is an alternative as-
set to physical capital and required for second period transactions. On a balanced growth
path, per capita educational expenditures, human capital, physical capital, consumption
during working years, and consumption during retirement all grow at a constant rate
g determined by the human capital production function. The monetary variables of the
economy, the inﬂation rate and the nominal rate of interest, remain constant and vary
with the rate of money growth, θ. Equations (25)—(32) characterize the laissez faire
balanced growth path of the economy.
3 First best
Let the social welfare function be presented by the discounted sum of the average of all
generations’ lifetime utilities. The ﬁrst best is then characterized by maximizing this
function subject to every generation’s human capital formation and resource constraint.
The human capital formation is given by equation (1); the resource constraint for the
generation born at time t is given by
Kt + F(Kt,H t)=Ntct + Nt−1dt + Kt+1 + Nt+1et+1,





















Now with e dt+1/e dt =1in the steady state, st+1/pt+1ht remains constant over time.
11Otherwise, with g>0, we have ct and dt+1 increasing per period, while u(ct,d t+1) remains the
same or is decreasing.









dt +( 1+n)(kt+1 + et+1).


























dt − (1 + n)(kt+1 + et+1)
¸)
(33)
where ρ ∈ (0,1) is the discount factor reﬂecting the “planner’s” social time preference,
and μt/(1+ρ)t and λt/(1+ρ)t are the multipliers associated with the resource constraint
and the human capital equation at time t.T h e ﬁrst order conditions with respect to




(1 + n)(1 + ρ)
, (35)
(1 + ρ)μt = λt+1
h




ϕ(b et+2) − b et+2ϕ0 (b et+2)
¤
, (36)





μtϕ0 (b et+1)=λt(1 + n). (38)
Finally, the transversality condition is:
limt→∞
λtkt+1 + μtht+1
(1 + ρ)t =0 . (39)
In characterizing the optimal values of the economic variables, I originally do not
mix the implications of either (37) or (38) with those of other ﬁrst-order conditions
of the problem. This facilitates the characterization of second-best outcomes without
the instruments for controlling kt and et which I shall discuss later. Thus derive an
expression for λt+1/λt once from (35) by writing it for t +1and t and dividing one by

















b ct−1, b dt
´ =[ ϕ(b et)]
β−1 ud
³








=( 1 + n)(1 + ρ)
ud(ct,d t+1)
uc(ct,d t+1)
=( 1+n)(1 + ρ)
ud
³




b ct, b dt+1
´. (41)






(1 + n)(1 + ρ)
ud
³




b ct−1, b dt
´. (42)
Next, substituting from (4) in (37) yields λt+1/λt =( 1 + ρ)(1 + n)/(1 + rt+1).
Equating this to the expression for λt+1/λt in (41) and using (42)
1+rt+1 =









b ct, b dt+1
´. (43)
Finally, use equation (38) to substitute for μt and μt+1 into (36). Divide the resulting








1−β (1 + ρ)
ud
³

















On the balanced growth path, b ct and b dt+1 remain constant over time so that equations
(42), (43), and (44) simplify to
ud
³




b c, b d
´ =
1
(1 + n)(1 + ρ)[ϕ(b e)]
1−β, (45)






(1 + ρ)[ϕ(b e)]
1−β −
£
ϕ(b e) − b eϕ0 (b e)
¤o
. (47)






in what follows I assume β<1.13
Equation (45) shows the ﬁrst-best marginal rate of intertemporal substitution in
consumption. It is the counterpart of equation (17) for the laissez faire. For the two
be the same, not only (46) must hold but i =0so that the opportunity cost of holding
money is zero (as required by Friedman rule). Equation (46) is the modiﬁed golden rule
condition; this is generally not satisﬁed in the laissez faire.





(1 + n)[ϕ(b e) − b eϕ0 (b e)]
w
. (49)
This is the counterpart of equation (2). The two diﬀer in that the laissez faire equation
does not include the right-hand side terms in braces. This reﬂects the externality
that parents bestow on their children by educating themselves. Recall that education
increases one’s human capital which also enhances the human capital of one’s children.
Parents do not take this externality into account when deciding on their own educational
attainment. Observe also that this is a positive externality. The above equation is
in accordance with this in that with ϕ(·) being concave, ϕ(b e) − b eϕ0 (b e) > 0 so that
ϕ0 (b e) < [1 + r]/w.
With the ﬁrst-best allocations being the same as in Docquier et al. (2007), it is plain
that the introduction of money leaves the relationship between laissez faire and ﬁrst-best
solutions intact as in their model. That is, comparison of the ﬁrst-best values of (b k,b e),
which vary with the social planner’s discount rate, with their laissez-faire counterparts
reveals three possible regimes: First-best values are larger for both b k and b e; ﬁrst-best
12Using (46), condition [ϕ(e e)]
β < 1+ρ also implies ϕ(e e) < (1 + r)/(1 + n) so that at the ﬁrst best,
r>n .
13This assumption makes the satisfaction of (48) easier; it is neither necessary nor suﬃcient for it.
17value of b k i ss m a l l e ro re q u a l ,a n dﬁrst-best value of b e is larger; and (iii) ﬁrst-best values
are smaller for both b k and b e (with the ﬁrst-best values moving from (i) to (iii) as the
utility of future generations is discounted more and more).
3.2 Decentralization
Decentralization of the ﬁrst-best requires the use of a number of ﬁscal instruments,




t denote lump sum taxes imposed at time t on the young of
generation T and the old of generation T −1, and σ the rate of subsidy on educational
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The remaining steady-state equations in (25)—(32) do not change. Thus the market
solutions for b c, b d,b e,b k,w,r,i, and π are now found from equations (25), (28), (29), (31),
18(32), and (52)—(54). To have these equations lead to the ﬁrst-best balanced growth
path characterized by (45)—(46), the policy instruments must be set as follows. First,
lump-sum taxes zy,zo must be set such that the modiﬁed golden rule (46) is attained.14
This requirement is commonplace in overlapping generations models. Second, to have
the ﬁrst best condition (47), or (49), satisﬁed, a subsidy is required on the purchase of
e. The subsidy rate is found from (47) and (54) to be15
σ =




(1 + n)[ϕ(b e) − b eϕ0 (b e)]
1+r
,
where b e and r take their ﬁrst-best values. Observe also that in the ﬁrst best, with
condition (46) satisﬁed, the above relationship is simpliﬁed to
σ =
(1 + n)[ϕ(b e) − b eϕ0 (b e)]
1+r
. (55)
Finally, attaining (45) is predicated on the well-known result in the money literature
that at the optimum there should be no opportunity cost in holding money; that is that
i must be equal to zero. To have (45) satisﬁed, one must set i =0in equation (25).
The implication of this for the rate of money growth is straightforward. Substituting
i =0in equation (15) yields (1 + r)(1+π)=1so that from (46)
1+π =
1
(1 + ρ)(1 + n)[ϕ(b e)]
1−β





− 1 < 0, (56)
where b e is set at its ﬁrst-best value. The sign of θ follows from the transversality
condition (48).
The following proposition summarizes the results of this section.
14To be precise, one needs to set either z
y or z
o; the other is determined through the government’s
budget constraint (51).
15In the presence of the subsidy, the young choose e et at t to maximize wtϕ(e et) − (1 + rt)(1− σ)e et.
This yields, in the steady state,
ϕ
0 (e e)=
(1 + r)(1− σ)
w
.
19Proposition 2 The decentralization of the ﬁrst-best balanced growth path requires gen-
eration speciﬁc lump-sum taxes, a subsidy on educational expenditures given by equation
(55), and the satisfaction of Friedman rule that requires the opportunity cost of holding
money to be zero.
4 Second best with control of physical capital
Assume now that educational subsidies are unavailable so that the level of investment in
education is not optimal. The question I want to address is if the Friedman rule continues
to be optimal as long as the government can control the level of physical capital in the
economy. To answer this question, I ﬁrst characterize the second-best allocation when
k can be controlled but not e. The formulation of this problem is exactly as that in the
ﬁr s tb e s tw i t ht h es o l ed i ﬀerence of not being able to optimize over e. The optimization
problem is summarized by the Lagrangian (33) where the optimization is done with
respect to ct,d t+1,k t+1, and ht+1. The corresponding ﬁrst-order conditions are (34),
(35), (37) and (36). Speciﬁcally, ﬁrst-order condition (38) with respect to et+1does
not hold which means equation (44) does not hold. The equations that characterize
this second best are (42) and (43) and their corresponding balanced growth versions,
equations (45) and (46). This also means that, as with the ﬁrst-best, the second-best
solution satisﬁes the no intertemporal consumption distortion, despite the fact that the
choice of e is distorted, and the modiﬁed golden rule.
Interestingly, as long as one can control b k and thus r = f0(b k), the condition for an
undistorted intertemporal consumption decision remains i =0 .G i v e n a n y b e, setting
r =( 1+n)(1 + ρ)[ϕ(b e)]
1−β − 1 ensures that the modiﬁed golden rule condition (46)
is satisﬁed. Setting i =0on top of this ensures that the intertemporal consumption
decision remains undistorted. This indicates the optimality of the Friedman rule in the
second-best as well. We have:
20Proposition 3 Friedman rule holds in a second-best environment wherein the levels of
education and human capital are suboptimal, as long as physical capital can be controlled
and the modiﬁed golden rule is satisﬁed.
4.1 Why Friedman rule?
Given our second-best environment, one may wonder why introducing an additional
distortion through the violation of the Friedman rule does not improve welfare. The
answer lies in the fact the violation of the Friedman rule, in either direction, will not
alleviate the existing distortion due to the non-optimality of educational. To demon-
strate this, ﬁrst observe ﬁrst that in the second-best the relationship between b e and b k is
governed by the laissez-fair condition (30) and in the ﬁrst-best by equation (49). These
relationships imply that, for any given same value of b k,














where the inequality sign follows from the concavity of ϕ(·). It then follows from equa-












where superscripts FB and SB de-





























Intuitively, as b k increases, (1 + r)/w declines and this lowers the cost of borrowing to
educate oneself relative to returns to education. This, in turn, increases the demand for
education. It follows from equation (59) that the graph of (57) slopes upward. Similarly,
one can easily establish, through diﬀerentiation, that the graph of (58), relating b e and b k
in the ﬁrst best, also slopes upward. On the other hand, diﬀerentiation establishes that
21Figure 1:
the graph of the modiﬁed golden rule condition (46) which holds both in the second
best as well as ﬁrst best, slopes downward. Diagram 1 depicts these three graphs.
The upshot of all this is that the ﬁrst-best value of b e exceeds its second-best value,
while the ﬁrst-best value of b k is smaller than its second-best value. We have
b eSB < b eFB,
b kSB > b kFB.
These inequalities show that whereas the second-best value of b e must increase, the
second-best value of b k must decrease in order to move the second-best equilibrium
“closer” to the ﬁrst-best equilibrium.
Now observe that the laissez-fair condition (30), which governs the relationship be-






. This implies that while a change in θ changes the equilibrium values
of b e and b k, it will leave the relationship between the two intact. In terms of Dia-




/w. Put diﬀerently, changing θ moves the equilibrium values of b e and b k in
the same direction. Either it increases both b e and b k or decreases them. This means
that violating the Friedman rule has two oﬀsetting eﬀects. It alleviates one of the ex-
isting distortions in the variables b e or b k, but exacerbates the other one. Considering
that the violation of the Friedman rule is itself an added source of distortion, in one’s
intertemporal choice, there is no obvious net beneﬁtt oi t .
4.2 First versus second best
The ﬁnding that b eSB < b eFB and b kSB > b kFB allows one to compare the ﬁrst-best and
second-best values of the other variables of interest. Speciﬁcally, with b kSB > b kFB, it
follows that rSB <r FB and wSB >w FB. However, at any given time t, it is not w
that matters to the individual but wh t.N o wht grows at the rate of gFB = ϕ(b eFB)−1
in the ﬁr s tb e s ta n dgSB = ϕ(b eSB) − 1 in the second best, with gSB <g FB. Finally,
o b s e r v et h a tw h i l ei =0in both ﬁrst and second best, the corresponding money growth
rate that induces this diﬀers across the two equilibria. Because condition (43) holds in







With b eSB < b eFB, the optimal monetary growth rate–the Friedman rule–calls for a
smaller monetary growth rate. That is
θSB <θ FB < 0.
These results are summarized as:
23Proposition 4 Let b k denote physical capital to human capital ratio, g denote the growth
rate of the economy, θ denote the money growth rate, and superscripts FB and SB
denote ﬁrst- and second-best solutions. Then, b kSB > b kFB, b eSB < b eFB,g SB <g FB, and
θSB <θ FB < 0.
5 Second best without control of physical capital
Assume now that diﬀerential lump-sum tax and transfers are not feasible and the govern-
ment cannot control the level of physical capital in the economy. However, educational
subsidies are available and b e is set optimally. To characterize this second-best equi-
librium, one can again formulate the problem as in the ﬁrst best with the exception
of not optimizing over k. Speciﬁcally, the optimization problem is summarized by the
Lagrangian (33) where the optimization is done with respect to ct,d t+1,h t+1, and et+1.
The ﬁrst-order condition that does not hold in this case is (37) and thus (43). The
equations that characterize this second-best allocation are then the same as (45) and
(47): One continues to require an undistorted intertemporal consumption decision and
an undistorted decision concerning educational expenditures.
Unlike the previous two cases, the Friedman rule of i =0no longer ensures that
equation (45), requiring an undistorted intertemporal consumption decision, is satisﬁed.
This arises because the modiﬁed golden rule condition (46) does not hold in this second
best. Put diﬀerently, bringing about an undistorted intertemporal consumption decision
when the modiﬁed golden rule is not satisﬁed, requires that Friedman rule is violated.
Indeed, from equations (25) and (29), condition (45) is satisﬁed if
i =
(1 + r) − (1 + ρ)(1 + n)[ϕ(b e)]
1−β
α(1 + r)(1+ρ)[ϕ(b e)]
−β −
n




α(1 + ρ)(1 + n)[ϕ(b e)]
1−β
α(1 + r)(1+ρ)[ϕ(b e)]
−β −
n
(1 + r) − (1 + ρ)(1 + n)[ϕ(b e)]
1−β
o.(61)
In the ﬁrst best, when b k i ss e ta ti t so p t i m a lv a l u e ,(1 + r)=( 1+ρ)(1 + n)[ϕ(b e)]
1−β
24and equation (60) simpliﬁes to i =0 ;s i m i l a r l ye q u a t i o n( 6 1 )r e d u c e st oθ = −1+
(1 + n)ϕ(b e)/(1 + r)=−1+[ ϕ(b e)]
β /(1 + ρ) < 0 which is the ﬁrst-best value of θ
d e r i v e di ne q u a t i o n( 5 6 ) .
Observe also that 1+θ must always be positive. It then follows that denominator
on the right-hand side of (61) and thus (60) is positive. This implies that i has the same
sign as (1 + r) − (1 + ρ)(1 + n)[ϕ(b e)]
1−β . Put diﬀerently, when second-best optimality
requires i>0, it means that 1+r>(1 + ρ)(1 + n)[ϕ(b e)]
1−β and the equilibrium is
characterized by a “low” physical-capital to human-capital ratio. On the other hand,
when i<0 is optimal the equilibrium is characterized by a “high” physical-capital to
human-capital ratio. This makes sense. A positive level of i is associated with a “high”
level of θ which depresses b k. The following proposition summarizes the results of this
section.
Proposition 5 (i) The second-best balanced growth environment wherein physical-capital
cannot be controlled is characterized by equations (45) and (47).
(ii) Friedman rule does not hold in this environment.
(iii) The optimal nominal interest rate is given by equation (60) and the optimal
monetary growth rate by (61).
(iv) A positive (negative) nominal interest rate is associated with a “low” (“high”)
value of physical-capital to human-capital ratio.
6 Money, growth, and Friedman rule
This section examines how the laissez-faire economy responds to changes in the rate of
monetary growth. In doing so, it also determines the precise nature of the change in the
second-best values of b e and b k discussed previously, as the inclusion of lump-sum taxes
b zy and b zo in the steady-state equations does not change the results. It also revisits what
one means in this model by “Friedman rule”.
Substitute for i from equation (29) into equations (25)—(26) and simplify to get
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With equations (31)—(32) determining w and r as functions of b k, equations (62)—(63)
determine b c and b d as functions of b e,b k and θ. Moreover, equation (30) relates b e to w and
r and thus to b k. Substituting for b e as a function b k in (62)—(63) then yields a solution for

















into equation (27) and diﬀerentiate the resulting equation totally with respect
















where I also present the expression for Γ noting that it is positive.
To determine the expression for the right-hand side of (64), partially diﬀerentiate
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(1 + r)(1 + θ)2 < 0. (67)
Intuitively, as θ increases the relative price of future goods to present consumption
increases so that consumers respond by lowering their consumption of future goods and
increasing their consumption of present goods.
26Substituting for ∂b c/∂θ and ∂ b d/∂θ from (66)—(67) into the bracketed expression on











α(1 − α) b uc





This result may at ﬁrst appear to be counter-intuitive. An increase in θ increases the
cost of holding money. As a result, consumers should want to lower their cash holdings
and switch into holdings of real capital. The intuition lies in the model’s rationalization
for holding money. With a Clower cash constraint, people’s future consumption is equal
to a multiple of their cash holdings. Thus a reduction in cash holdings implies a higher
reduction in future consumption. This, in turn, requires a smaller level of real savings
to be carried into the future.






with db e/db k>0 from (59). Conse-
quently, db e/dθ < 0. Now with the growth rate of the economy being g = ϕ(b e) − 1 and




This result is summarized as:
Proposition 6 An increase in the money growth rate leads to a reduction in the bal-
anced growth path values of the physical capital per human capital ratio and the rate of
growth of the economy.
6.1 Non-uniqueness of Friedman rule
That Friedman rule of i =0ensures the satisfaction of the optimality condition (45)
is predicated on the stipulation that there are no consumption taxes in the economy.
27Assume instead that the government imposes a tax on the consumption of the young,
c,a tt h er a t eo fτ. This changes the market equilibrium condition (25) to16
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This equation will be reduced to the optimality condition (45) as long as
i =
τ (1 + θ)
α
. (68)
Moreover, one can easily see from (29) that to have (68) satisﬁed, all that is needed is
to set θ, for any given τ, according to
θ =
α(1 + n)ϕ(b e)
α(1 + r) − τ (1 + n)ϕ(b e)
− 1=
α
α(1 + ρ)[ϕ(b e)]
−β − τ
− 1, (69)
where b e takes its ﬁrst-best value.
To sum, as long as there are no commodity taxes (τ =0 ), i must be equal to zero
in the ﬁrst best, requiring the monetary authority to set θ according to (56). However,
if the ﬁscal authority levies a tax on the ﬁrst-period consumption goods at a rate equal
to τ, monetary authority should set θ according to (69). Put diﬀerently, optimality
condition (45) can be attained as a competitive equilibrium not just for i =0 , and thus
for a monetary growth rate governed by (56); but for a continuum of i and a continuum
of monetary growth rates and tax rates on c that satisfy (69). That is, the Friedman
requirement for a zero opportunity cost of money holding will be satisﬁed by a continuum
16Observe also that allowing for a tax rate on c changes the market conditions (52)—(53) to
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28of (τ,θ). Intuitively, what is important here is the relative intertemporal price. In this
model, the two policy instruments τ and θ control this single price (through i). In other
words, we have one instrument too many.17
Proposition 7 Friedman rule can be satisﬁed by a continuum of monetary growth rates
and tax rates on consumption during working y e a r sw i t ht h et w ob e i n gr e l a t e da c c o r d i n g
to equation (69) resulting in a nominal interest rate that is characterized by (68). Only
if there are no taxes on consumption during working years, Friedman rule requires the
nominal interest rate to be zero. In this case, the monetary growth rate is negative and
given by equation (56).
7C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has studied the implications of introducing money into an overlapping-
generations model with endogenous growth where the rationalization for money holding
comes from the Clower’s cash-in-advance constraint. It has considered an economy pop-
ulated with ﬁnitely-lived individuals whose human capital is determined partly through
education and partly through their inherited human capital. Throughout the paper, to
emphasize allocative eﬃciency, the paper has assumed no government tax requirements.
With an external revenue requirement, one can always reject Friedman rule by suitably
ruling out certain ﬁscal instruments.18
The main message of the paper has been that, as long as the government can fully
control the level of physical capital in the economy and sets it to satisfy the modiﬁed
golden rule, Friedman rule remains optimal. The result holds regardless of the ability
of the government to control the level of human capital. With the control of human
capital, controlling physical capital yields a ﬁrst-best environment. Given this perspec-
17This does not arise in monetary models with money in the utility function. There, real balances
also enter the utility function and the two instruments τ and θ are needed to control the relative
intertemporal price and real balances.
18The stark example is provided by the case when there are no ﬁscal instruments.
29tive, the result has generalized the earlier result of Abel (1987) and Gahvari (1988)
derived for overlapping-generations models without endogenous growth. Without the
control of human capital, the economy is in a second-best environment. The result thus
contradicts one’s intuition based on the second-best theory. The paper has clariﬁed this
apparent contradiction by demonstrating that introducing an additional distortion in
the economy, via the violation of Friedman rule, does nothing to alleviate the existing
distortion in human capital accumulation as long as one can fully control physical capital
accumulation. Furthermore, the paper has demonstrated that notwithstanding a zero
nominal interest rate in both ﬁrst- and second-best environments, the monetary growth
rate and the economy’s endogenous rate of growth are both smaller in the second best.
The paper has also studied another second-best environment; one in which human
capital accumulation can be controlled but not physical capital. It has shown that in this
setting the distortion due to the violation of Friedman rule does alleviate the distortion
due to the lack of physical capital accumulation. Here, second-best optimality calls for
the violation of Friedman rule.
Another interesting result is the existence of a negative relationship between money
growth rate on the one hand and the endogenous growth rate of the economy on the
other. The reason for this is that, in a cash-in-advance constraint model, people carry
cash to ﬁnance a fraction of their future consumption. Put the other way, their future
consumption is equal to a multiple of their cash holdings. Consequently, an increase in
the growth rate of money supply, which increases the cost of holding cash and reduces
money holdings, leads to a reduction in future consumption that is higher than the
original reduction in the individuals’ money holdings. This, in turn, requires a smaller
level of real savings to be carried into the future. Finally, the paper has also shown
that, in the context of a cash-in-advance constraint model, Friedman rule is not unique.
A continuum of monetary growth rates and tax rates on consumption during working
years result in a zero opportunity cost of holding money.
30Appendix
Per human capital notation used in the paper:
b et ≡ et/ht−1,b kt = kt/ht,b ct ≡ ct/ht, b dt ≡ dt/ht−1,ϕ(b et) ≡ ht/ht−1.
A useful property: Rewrite equation (47) as
[w − (1 + n)b e]ϕ0 (b e)=( 1+n)[ϕ(b e)]
1−β
h
(1 + ρ) − [ϕ(b e)]
β
i
Then transversality condition (46) [ϕ(b e)]
β < 1+ρ also implies that
w − (1 + n)b e>0. (A1)








, the solution found from equations
































































































































/∂b k yields equation (64) in the text.
Now observe that one can think of the left-hand side of (A2) as the demand for b k and
its right-hand side as the supply of b k. The static stability condition then requires that




to be downward-sloping in r or upward-sloping in





Derivation of (66)—(67): Diﬀerentiate equations (62)—(63) partially with respect to
θ. The resulting equations are, in matrix notation,
Ã
b ucd − e ud
e uc b ucc b udd − e ud































(1+n)ϕ(e e) −b udd + e ud
e uc b ucd









where ∆ is deﬁned in the text by equation (65). Equations (66)—(67) allow immediately
from (A4).








































b ucd − b udd
¶
.
Assuming d and c are normal goods, one can easily show that b ucd − (b ud/b uc)b ucc > 0
and (b ud/b uc) b ucd−b udd > 0 (where due to quasi-concavity of preferences, −(b ud/b uc)
2 b ucc−
b udd +2(b ud/b uc) b ucd > 0). Consequently, ∆ > 0.
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